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LOCAL .GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
During its 1988 term, the United States Supreme Court again handed
down a number of significant decisions involving local governments. In
what was undoubtedly the most important case, the Court restricted the
authority of local governments to "set aside" a percentage of their
contracts for minority contractors;' the discussion section that follows
analyzes that decision in some detail. Other noteworthy equal protection
decisions confirmed the continuing importance of that clause with respect
to the selection of governmental bodies at the local level.2 Many of the
remaining Supreme Court decisions involving local governments con-
cerned the scope of actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 The Court
excluded both states and state officials acting in their official capacities
from the section's definition of "person," '4 held that inadequate training
of police officers could serve as the basis for liability in some situations,'
and allowed litigants to qualify for attorney fees even when they failed
to prevail on the "central issue" of the litigation.6 In a related area,
the Court refused to hold a municipality vicariously liable for the acts
of an employee whose actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 7 Finally, the
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* J. Denson Smith Professor, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State Uni-
versity.
1. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). The case is
discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 85-116.
2. Quinn v. Millsap, 109 S. Ct. 2324 (1989) (state law requirement that one own
real property in order to serve on board of local government denied individuals who do
not own property equal protection); Board of Estimate v. Morris, 109 S. Ct. 1433 (1989)
(structure of New York City board of estimate violates one person, one vote principle).
3. For an analysis of earlier decisions establishing the parameters of governmental
liability under § 1983, see Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law,
1979-1980, 41 La. L. Rev. 483, 509-18 (1981).
4. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
5. City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989) (inadequacy of police training
may serve as basis for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact
and deficiency identified in municipality's training program is closely related to ultimate
injury incurred).
6. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 1486 (1989).
7. Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
Court also upheld, against a First Amendment challenge, the right of
a municipality to exclude minors from dance halls.'
In the federal courts of appeals, litigation regarding the constitutional
rights of governmental employees also produced a number of important
decisions during the year beginning July 1988. Those decisions addressed
both substantive9 and procedural' ° protections afforded by the Federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in one
of these cases," and the Court's decision should help to clarify this
confusing area of law.
The decisions of Louisiana's appellate courts involving local gov-
ernments produced few, if any, dramatic developments. Nonetheless, the
courts addressed a wide range of local government law issues in a wide
variety of contexts. Once again, the bulk of the cases involved public
employees, land use controls, and tort liability.
8. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989) (coming together of dance
hall patrons to engage in recreational dancing does not qualify as intimate, expressive,
or social association within protection of the First Amendment).
9. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,
110 S. Ct. 48 (1989) (political patronage employment practices that are not substantial
equivalent of dismissal do not violate the First Amendment); Fraternal Order of Police
Hobart Lodge No. 121 v. City of Hobart, 864 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1988) (claim that city
council, in league with mayor and police chief, enacted hours-of-work ordinance for
purpose of punishing police officers' political opposition to them does not state a violation
of the First Amendment); Morales v. Stierheim, 848 F.2d 1145 (lth Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1124 (1989) (transfer of city planner who criticized supervising com-
munity advisory board was justified by governmental interests that outweighed impact on
the First Amendment rights of planner); Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 262 (1988) (municipal fire marshal's official report
concluding that fire was caused by aggregated arson did not address a matter of public
concern within the meaning of Connick).
10. See Cremeans v. City of Roseville, 861 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 2065 (1989) (brief notice to officer before meeting of city retirement board
to consider request for medical retirement satisfied due process requirements for pre-
termination hearing); Fraternal Order of Police v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989)
(failure to provide officers with information concerning evidence against them prior to
discharging police officers for refusal to submit to urinalysis testing upon suspicion of
drug use denies officers due process); Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d
304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988) (opportunity to explain incident to
supervisor satisfies requirements for pretermination due process even though supervisor
was not the official empowered to remove employee); Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d
1004 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989) (procedural due process does
not require that discharged public employee receive pretermination hearing before neutral
and impartial decision-maker so long as he is given hearing before supervisor that fired
him). See generally Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1986-
1987, 48 La. L. Rev. 303, 322-27 (1987).
11. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 110
S. Ct. 48 (1989).
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Isolated state decisions involving the employees of local governments
considered matters such as the constitutional rights of employees, 2 re-
tirement benefits, 3 and ethics.' 4 Most, however, focused on statutory
protections afforded to various types of public employees. The Louisiana
Supreme Court ruled that full-time teachers could not also acquire tenure
as school bus drivers for the school board that employed them as
teachers, 5 and the courts of appeal handed down a number of decisions
construing both civil service and teacher tenure laws. In addition to
reviewing the merits of individual suspensions and dismissals,' 6 the courts
of appeal allowed a trial court to limit its review of a teacher's dismissal
to the transcript of the school board meeting,' 7 declared the local gov-
ernment employer an indispensable party to an employee's appeal of a
civil service board decision affirming the employee's dismissal, 8 required
employees to obtain a writ of mandamus ordering compliance before
seeking a contempt citation of a local government for failure to comply
with an order of its civil service board, 9 refused to construe an ordinance
abolishing a particular position as implicitly amending a prior ordinance
establishing rules for reductions in the work force, 20 permitted the New
Orleans Civil Service Commission to exclude leave days in computing
12. See Brumfield v. Department of Fire, 531 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988)
(employee wrongfully discharged because of procedural irregularities was entitled to back
pay for the period of his wrongful discharge). For an analysis of an earlier decision in
the Brumfield litigation, see Murchison, 1986-1987 Developments in the Law, supra note
10, at 322-27.
13. City of Shreveport v. Burling, 535 So. 2d 1164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988) (sham
marriage did not terminate widow's benefits as survivor of city employee).
14. Tebbe v. Louisiana Comm'n on Ethics, 540 So. 2d 270 (La. 1989) (use of secretary
to type papers needed for masters degree did not violate ethics code provisions regarding
economic conflict of interest).
15. Thorne v. Monroe City School Bd., 542 So. 2d 490 (La. 1989).
16. Washington v. Department of Police, 539 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989)
(police officer was legally terminated for violating regulations regarding moral conduct,
malfeasance in office, theft, and neglect of duty); Jeff v. Department of Recreation, 532
So. 2d 817 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 381 (1988) (evidence that failed
to establish employee was responsible for correct preparation of payroll was insufficient
to support suspension for failing to monitor payroll reporting procedures); Wilson v.
Department of Pub. Works, 528 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988) (employee who
failed to produce doctor's certificate when he showed up on work site following 90-day
leave of absence was properly discharged for failure to return to work); Tsai v. Department
of Streets, 526 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 274, 276 (1988)
(city could fire supervisors but not workers for failing to perform eight hours of work
where practice had continued with knowledge of supervisors for many years).
17. Ford v. Caldwell Parish School Bd., 541 So. 2d 955 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
18. Coulon v. Slidell Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 542 So. 2d 151 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1989).
19. Achord v. City of Baton Rouge, 542 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
20. Detillier v. Town of Gramercy, 542 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
accumulation of the hours necessary to qualify for overtime pay,2'
declined to reduce the back pay owed to an improperly suspended
employee by the amount of unemployment compensation that the em-
ployee received during the suspension, 22 held that a civil service com-
mission lacked jurisdiction to revieW a city's refusal to approve a police
officer for special details that were performed in off-duty hours, 23 and
precluded a parish from unilaterally cancelling compensatory leave that
had been earned by its employees. 24
The land use decisions also included one decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court. The court held that the city of New Orleans could close
one block of a city street and lease the block to a private interest for
60 years. 25 The remaining decisions of the courts of appeal invalidated
a variance where the record failed to establish that the landowner was
suffering a demonstrable hardship and that granting the variance would
positively affect neighborhood prosperity and welfare,2 6 ruled that op-
erating a commercial enterprise without a required permit was a "use"
violation of the zoning ordinance for statute of limitation purposes,2 7
declined to impute the suspicions of a police officer to the local gov-
ernment that employed him for the purposes of applying the two-year
statute of limitations applicable to zoning violations, 2s allowed adjacent
landowners to force zoning authorities to require an owner to remove
or to modify a structure that violated building and zoning regulations,2 9
upheld a city's determination that an arcade was not a retail sales
operation,30 ruled that crushing and recycling aluminum cans was not
permitted in an area zoned for general commercial uses,3 and refused
to require a local governing body to hold a hearing on a zoning request
21. Sanchez v. City of New Orleans, 538 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
542 So. 2d 1390 (1989).
22. Serpas v. Department of Police, 529 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
532 So. 2d 767 (1988).
23. Sterling v. Board of Comm'rs, 527 So. 2d 1122 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
24. Jones v. City Parish of E. Baton. Rouge, 526 So. 2d 462 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1988).
25. Coliseum Square Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 544 So. 2d 351 (La. 1989), aff'g
528 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 4th Cir.).
26. Guenther v. Zoning Appeals Bd., 542 So. 2d 612 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied,
544 So. 2d 407 (1989).
27. St. Tammany Parish v. Masters, 542 So. 2d 112 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
28. City of New Orleans v. Elms, 542 So. 2d 17 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted,
548 So. 2d 1215 (1989).
29. City of New Orleans v. Rasmussen, 542 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 548 So. 2d 334 (1989).
30. Busalacchi v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 535 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1988).
31. Gorman v. Mekarski, 528 So. 2d 1034 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.
2d 357 (1988).
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when the planning commission had previously held a hearing as required
by statute. 2
In tort opinions in both the first and fourth circuit courts of appeal,
the courts returned to a question that has frequently arisen since the
abolition of goverhmental immunity in the 1974 Louisiana Constitution:
defining the entity responsible for torts committed by public officers
and their subordinates. The recent opinions reaffirmed that sheriffs, not
the parishes or the state, are liable for both torts committed by deputies
and injuries to prisoners for whom the sheriff is responsible. The dis-
cussion section that follows analyzes these decisions.33
Other noteworthy tort decisions in the courts of appeal addressed
a number of issues. They applied the negligence standard to a number
of different situations involving local governments as defendants,34 ex-
plained when public property presents an unreasonable risk of harm
that gives rise to strict liability under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317,11
32. Lauer v. City of Kenner, 536 So. 2d 767 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988), writ denied,
538 So. 2d 594 (1989).
33. See Nail v. Parish of Iberville, 542 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Cooley
v. State, 533 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); see infra text accompanying notes
117-61.
34. See, e.g., Byrd v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 543 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 550 So. 2d 628 (1989) (statute barring minors under 16 from working around
power driven machinery provided basis for liability award to student injured at age 14
while engaged in extracurricular school activity); Berry v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 539
So. 2d 773 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (town had duty to provide advance notice of
construction at railroad crossing beyond placing barricade just a few feet in front of
crossing); Murphy v. City of New Orleans, 537 So. 2d 1183 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988),
writ denied, 541 So. 2d 896 (1989) (regional transit authority could not be held liable
for accident at bus stop it had no duty to maintain); Carter v. City of Houma, 536 So.
2d 573 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) (city was negligent in failing to maintain protective posts
around catch basin drain cover that had previously been damaged and repaired); Sutter
v. Audubon Park Comm'n, 533 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538
So. 2d 597 (1989) (city park was not liable for injury to patron who was shot by unknown
assailant in restroom facility); Morris v. Canipe, 528 So. 2d 659 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988)
(school board had no duty to report its knowledge of minor's alleged sexual misconduct
in order to protect against commission of intentional torts against other children who
were away from school grounds during summer recess).
35. Langer v. Bienville Parish Police Jury, 541 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 546 So. 2d 177 (1989) (plaintiff failed to establish that curve in road was
unreasonably hazardous or dangerous); Williams v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 541 So.
2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (trial court finding that sidewalk curb presented unrea-
sonable risk of harm was clearly erroneous); Montgomery v. City of New Orleans, 537
So. 2d 1230 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (city could not be held strictly liable for imperfection
in sidewalk that did noi pose an unreasonable risk of harm); Kuck v. City of New
Orleans, 531 So. 2d 1142 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (city was liable for injuries to pedestrian
who fell on a defective sidewalk where a brick or bricks were missing); Watson v.
Department of Transp. & Dev., 529 So. 2d 427 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 533
So. 2d 361 (1988) (damaged yield sign did not create an unreasonable risk of harm);
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refused to hold local governments strictly liable under article 2317 without
proof that the government had actual or constructive notice of the
defective condition of its property,3 6 allowed landowners to recover for
the mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation they suffered when
the city trespassed on their property to dig out a ditch,3 7 ruled that the
state constitution permits local governments to receive the protections
of the statute immunizing landowners from liability when they allow
their property to be used for recreational uses,38 appeared to revive the
public duty doctrine in refusing to hold a police jury liable for damages
a landowner suffered as the result of the enactment of an unconstitutional
cockfighting ordinance,3 9 and refused to hold public officials liable for
torts committed in the performance of their official duties.
40
Hayes v. City of New Orleans, 527 So. 2d 1002 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 532
So. 2d 770 (1988) (city was not liable for damages from accident at intersection where
traffic light was malfunctioning and district court found the negligence of colliding drivers
to be 100 percent of the cause of the accident); Gotro v. Town of Melville, 527 So. 2d
568 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (town was liable for accident caused by a rut that extended
across a street).
36. See, e.g., Helgert v. City of New Orleans, 537 So. 2d 394 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1988), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 616 (1989); Griffin v. City of New Orleans, 533 So. 2d
1048 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Armstrong v. City of New Orleans, 539 So. 2d 1000 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1989). Apparently, none of the litigants challenged the constitutionality of
the notice requirement. For the suggestion that the requirement may violate the state
constitution's abrogation of governmental immunity, see Murchison, Local Government
Law, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985, 46 La. L. Rev. 491, 528-32 (1986).
37. Phillips v. Town of Many, 538 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
38. Broussard v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 539 So. 2d 824 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1989) (statute providing immunity for owners of recreational facilities barred recovery by
fisherman who fell on concrete boat ramp maintained by state on a small slip leading
to Intercoastal Canal). The recent decisions continued, however, to construe the statute
narrowly. See Sutter v. Audubon Park Comm'n, 533 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1988), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 597 (1989) (statute providing immunity for owners of
recreational facilities did not apply to city park). For analysis of the statutes and decisions
establishing the rule of strict construction, see Murchison, 1986-1987 Developments in the
Law, supra note 10, at 327-29; Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the
Law, 1985-1986, 47 La. L. Rev. 305, 323-32 (1986).
39. Roberson v. Bossier Parish Police Jury, 535 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988)
(police jury was not liable for damages defendant suffered as the result of its enactment
of an unconstitutional cockfighting ordinance because it owed no individual duty to
plaintiffs). The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d
1351 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the
Law, 1980-1981, 42 La. L. Rev. 564, 592-95 (1982), strongly criticized the public duty
doctrine and indicated that it should no longer limit the tort liability of local governments
in Louisiana. However, in 1987 the Louisiana Legislature enacted a statute that overruled
the precise holding in Stewart, see 1987 La. Acts No. 648, adding La. R.S. 33:4773(A),
analyzed in Murchison, 1986-1987 Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 330-31.
40. See Board of Examiners v. Neyrey, 542 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 548 So. 2d 1231 (1989) (individual members of a public body or agency who are
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The remaining decisions covered a wide assortment of topics. The
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the legislature's power to create a
statewide special district authorized to issue bonds and to levy a sales
tax,41 allowed a municipality to apply its local occupation tax to attor-
neys, 42 decided that equipment a taxpayer shipped into the city for use
in an assembly line was "corporeal movable property" subject to sales
tax,43 and ruled that an amendment authorizing higher debt limits for
specifically named parishes was an invalid local law." In addition,
opinions of the courts of appeal addressed a diverse group of issues
including the duty of parishes to fund expenses mandated by the leg-
islature, 45 the state constitution's ban on local or special acts,46 the
protections afforded to local governments by home rule charters, 47 elec-
public officials or officers are not personally liable for official actions of the body so
long as they act in good faith and without malice); Moore v. Taylor, 541 So. 2d 378
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1989) (justice of the peace enjoys absolute immunity when acting in
his judicial capacity); Dickerson v. Kemp, 540 So. 2d 467 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (district
attorney enjoys absolute immunity from suit charging violation of right to speedy trial
and prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Johnson v. Foti, 537 So. 2d 232
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 591 (1989) (district attorney was not
liable for negligence in allowing person to be incarcerated on fugitive warrant for 29 days
after notice that he would not be extradited, absent proof of malice); Akins v. Parish
of Jefferson, 529 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 5th Cir.), rev'd in part, 533 So. 2d 970 (1988),
reh'g granted in part, 539 So. 2d 44 (1989) (allegation that parish undertook to provide
drainage for subdivisions and failed to correct defect after notice was insufficient to state
cause of action against individual officers and employees absent allegations that they
exceeded the scope of their authority or violated clearly established rights).
41. Board of Directors v. All Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384 (La. 1988), analyzed in
Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 49 La. L.
Rev. 394, 406-20 (1988).
42. Mire v. City of Lake Charles, 540 So. 2d 950 (La. 1989) (application of municipal
occupation tax to attorneys was not an unconstitutional local regulation of the bar).
43. City of New Orleans v. Baumer Foods, Inc., 532 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1988).
44. Concerned Business and Property Owners of DeSoto, Inc. v. DeSoto Parish
School Bd., 531 So. 2d 436 (La. 1988). For analyses of previous decisions construing the
ban on local and special acts, see Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in
the Law, 1982-1983, 44 La. L. Rev. 373, 384-89 (1983); Murchison, Local Government
Law, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term, 40 La. L.
Rev. 681, 683-87 (1980); Murchison, Local Government Law, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term, 39 La. L. Rev. 843, 845-50 (1979).
45. St. Landry Parish Police Jury v. Clerk of Court, 536 So. 2d 1283 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d 1172 (1989) (police jury could not fund any nonstatutory
charges until all payments mandating specific payments had been made).
46. Parish of Jefferson v. Roemer, 539 So. 2d 97 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied,
541 So. 2d 873 (1989) (act changing method of appointment of expressway commission
was not a local or special act).
47. Id. (act changing method of appointment of expressway commission did not
violate constitutional provisions relating to home rule charters).
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tion irregularities, 41 annexation, 49 suspension and removal of public of-
ficers, 0 the police5' and revenue 2 powers of local governments, public
48. Merritt v. Hathorn, 537 So. 2d 340 (La. App.-2d Cir.), writ denied, 538 So. 2d
578 (1988) (minor irregularities in addresses and dates did not invalidate recall petition);
Becnel v. Madere, 535 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1i99
(1988) (evidence that proponents of recall election removed requests for withdrawal of
names from petition from registrar's office was insufficient to warrant invalidating recall
election absent evidence of actual tampering); Burks v. Lombard, 533 So. 2d 161 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 534 So. 2d 431 (1988) (votes cast for candidate who had
withdrawn from election were not to be counted in determining whether the candidate
who got the largest number of votes had a majority of votes so that no runoff was
required).
49. Allen Parish Water Dist. No. I v. City of Oakdale, 540 So.2d 564 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1989) (city could reenact annexation ordinance incorporating practically same area
as prior ordinance that had been voluntarily rescinded).
50. State v. Spooner, 532 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d
377 (1988) (statute providing for removal of public officers applies where felony occurred
in prior term but conviction became final in present term); Spooner v. West Baton Rouge
Parish School Bd., 526 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 479
(1988) (statute providing for suspension of public officer pending appeal of felony con-
viction applies even though felony occurred in prior term).
51. Odom v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 540 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 543 So. 2d 20 (1989) (police juries have discretionary authority to discontinue
exercise of privilege of operating ferries); Automated Bldg. Corp. v. Bossier City, 530
So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 533 So. 2d 358 (1988) (to order demolition
of structures, city must demonstrate that the buildings are in a dilapidated and dangerous
condition that endangers the public welfare); see also Myers v. City of Lafayette, 537
So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (city's failure to send written notice to liquor permit
applicant within time required for response gave applicant right to compel a formal
decision but not to compel issuance of the permit); Simon v. Lafayette Automotive,
Wrecker & Towing Control Comm., 532 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (certified
mail notice telling franchisee to appear before city-parish wrecker committee in 20 days
satisfied requirements of due process).
52. City of New Orleans v. Baumer Foods, Inc., 532 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1988) (equipment
taxpayer shipped into city for use in assembly line was "corporeal movable property"
subject to sales tax); City of Kenner v. Jo, Inc., 541 So. 2d 311 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1989) (filing of suit interrupted prescription on special assessment claim but did not
preserve city's privilege and lien against the property); Sales Tax Collector v. Westside
Sand Co., 534 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1240, cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3188 (1989) (sand removed from its natural state was tangible personal
property subject to sales tax); Murphy v. Estate of Sam, 527 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1988) (city's failure to attempt to notify record lot owners of tax delinquency and
pending tax sale rendered tax sale null and void notwithstanding passing of peremptive
period).
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contracts, 3 and the open meetings 4 and public records" laws.
FEDERAL LIMITS ON LocAL POWER
For more than twenty years, the United States Supreme Court has
struggled with the questions of what local governments must or can do
to eliminate the effects of past discrimination against racial and ethnic
minorities. Recent decisions have narrowed the scope of permissible
"affirmative action," but they have not yet completely foreclosed the
adoption of remedial programs by local governments.
Affirmative action requirements initially appeared as judicial man-
dates in school desegregation cases. Those cases imposed an "affirmative
duty" on local school boards that had discriminated in the past.5 6 That
duty required the boards to "take whatever steps might be necessary
to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch. 5 7 When a school district with a history
53. Celestine v. City of Lake Charles, 534 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988)
(promoter's obligation to indemnify city for any liability to third parties does not include
liability the city incurs for its own negligence); L & M Demolition, Inc. v. City of New
Orleans, 534 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d 1173 (1989)
(city had discretionary power to waive irregularities in bid bond in awarding public works
contract to lowest bidder, absent allegation of favoritism, misconduct, or ill practices);
Adams v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 531 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988)
(where warehouse inventory clerk who signed lease for vending machine had neither actual
or apparent authority and school board had never ratified contract, school board was
not bound to contract provision binding it to insure and to indemnify lessor of machine);
S.J. Lemoine, Inc. v. St. Landry Parish School Bd., 527 So. 2d 1150 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988) (rain and cold during contract period were valid excuses for delay in performance
of construction contract); HTW Transp. Co. v. New Orleans Aviation Bd., 527 So. 2d
339 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 532 So. 2d 121, 122, 129 (1988) (where plaintiff
was the highest responsible bidder on contract for ground transportation services, city
could not award the contract to a lower bidder that the city believed was better); Davis
v. Natchitoches Parish School Bd., 525 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (negligence
of school board in circulating differing sets of specifications gave contractor who did not
seek to enjoin contract an action for damages).
54. Norris v. Monroe City School Bd., 535 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 536 So. 2d 1199 (1988) (notice of executive session need not identify names of
litigants).
55. Hatfield v. Bush, 540 So. 2d 1178 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (employees were
indispensable parties to suit to compel production of leave records of individual employees);
cf. Thornton v. Department of Pub. Safety, 536 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988)
(department may not condition access to public records on payment of a fee).
56. See, e.g. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538, 99 S. Ct. 2971,
2979 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S. Ct.
1267, 1275 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 1693
(1968).
57. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 1693-94
(1968). Cf. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2979
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of discrimination failed to satisfy its affirmative duty, the Court allowed
the lower federal courts to consider race in fashioning a decree adequate
to remedy the constitutional violation. 8 Nonetheless, even in these cases,
the Court emphasized that the duty was not to achieve a particular
racial balance but to remedy the effects of past discrimination,59 and it
reversed a district court order that failed to adhere to this distinction. 60
Beyond the school desegregation cases, the Court has also been
forced to define the scope of the judicially imposed duty to remedy
past discrimination in employment cases. In the more recent of these
cases, the Court has been even less inclined than in the school deseg-
regation cases to produce results that mirror the racial makeup of the
community. This lessened commitment to racially balanced results has
manifested itself in at least two ways. First, in employment decisions,
the court has been less willing than in school decisions to infer that all
present disparities in the work force are the remnants of past discrim-
ination. 61 Second, the Court has been reluctant in the employment de-
cisions to order remedies that interfere with established expectations of
nonminority employees. Thus, the Court reversed a judicial order grant-
ing minority employees preferential protection from layoffs, 62 but upheld
(1979) ("[T]he measure of a post-Brown conduct of a school board under an unsatisfied
duty to liquidate a dual system, is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in
decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system.")
58. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.., 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971).
Specifically, the Court approved the use of majority-minority ratios in individual schools
as a "starting point for shaping a remedy," id. at 25, 91 S. Ct. at 1280; a requirement
that the school authorities prove that one-race schools were "not the result of present
or past discrimination on their part," id. at 26, 91 S. Ct. at 1281; "gerrymandering" of
attendance zones to the extent necessary "to dismantle [a] dual school system," id. at
28, 91 S. Ct. at 1282; and busing of students as "one tool of school desegregation."
Id. at 30, 91 S. Ct. at 1283.
59. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974) (no interdistrict
remedy without proof of interdistrict violation); see also School Bd. of Richmond v. State
Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92, 93 S. Ct. 1952 (1973), aff'g by an equally divided Court,
462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
60. E.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S. Ct. 2697
(1976).
61. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976). The Court
has been more willing to allow use of statistical disparities to prove violation of the Civil
Rights Act; see, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 108 S. Ct.
2777 (1988); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971), but the
Court's most recent decision in this area seems to impose a substantial limitation on the
use of statistical information to prove statutory violations. See Wards Cove Packing, Inc.
v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
62. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S. Ct. 2576
(1984).
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another that merely gave minority applicants preferences for new open-
ings without displacing existing employees. 63
During the 1970s, affirmative action programs established without
a prior judicial finding of past discrimination became increasingly com-
mon. The Supreme Court, however, did not evaluate the appropriateness
of affirmative action remedies outside the context of a judicial decree
until the 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.64 None of the five opinions in Bakke garnered the support of
a majority of the Court. 65 Nevertheless, Justice Powell's opinion an-
nouncing the Court's judgment articulated a basic premise that has
endured: All statutory classifications based on race are subject to the
"strict scrutiny" previously given to legislative classifications that dis-
criminate against racial and ethnic minorities. That strict scrutiny stan-
dard upholds classifications only when they are narrowly drawn to serve
compelling governmental interests.6
Bakke involved a challenge to a medical school admission system
that reserved sixteen percent of the positions in each entering class for
minority students. 67 Applying the strict scrutiny standard, Justice Powell
concluded that none of the reasons advanced by the university justified
63. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); cf. United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979) (private employer's voluntary
affirmative action program for a training program does not violate the 1964 Civil Rights
Act).
64. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
65. Justice Powell was the only member of the Court to concur completely in the
Court's judgment. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmum filed a joint opinion.
They dissented from the Court's holding that the program before the Court was invalid,
but concurred in the holding that race could be used as a criterion for admissions. Id.
at 324, 98 S. Ct. at 2765; see also id. at 387, 98 S. Ct. at 2797 (separate opinion of
Marshall, J.); id. at 402, 98 S. Ct. at 2805 (separate opinion of Blackmun, J.). Justice
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, concurred
in the holding that the admission program violated the Civil Rights Act, but he argued
that the Court should not have reached the broader constitutional issue. Id. at 409, 98
S. Ct. at 2808.
66. Mr. Justice Powell offered the following description of "strict scrutiny": "[A]
state must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and
substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary [to] the accomplishment of
its purpose of the safeguarding of its interest." Id. at 305, 98 S. Ct. at 2756 (plurality
opinion of Powell, J., quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22, 93 S. Ct. 2851,
2854-55 (1973)). For other descriptions of the strict scrutiny standard, see Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1986) ("[Any racial
classification 'must be justified by a compelling governmental interest' . . . [and] the means
chosen by the state to effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement
of that goal."'); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1984)
(Racial "classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional
muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary
... to the accomplishment' of its legitimate purpose.").
67. Ironically, the medical school's definition of minority included Asians, an inclusion
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its admissions set-aside program. He rejected the aim of securing a
particular racial balance in the student body as an impermissible goal, 6
and he regarded the other interests asserted by the university as insuf-
ficient to validate an admissions system that totally precluded nonmi-
nority students from competing for the positions that were reserved for
minority applicants. 69 He refused, however, to impose an absolute pro-
hibition on consideration of an applicant's race in the admissions process.
In his view, the university's interest in having a diverse student body
was sufficiently compelling to allow the medical school admissions com-
mittee to consider race as one of several factors designed to produce
the desired diversity.70
In 1986, the Supreme Court applied Bakke to the employment
context in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.71 Once again, no
opinion garnered a majority of the Court. This time, however, four
justices explicitly embraced the strict scrutiny standard for voluntary
affirmative action programs adopted by state and local governments. 71
Wygant involved a school board's policy73 that precluded a layoff
from reducing the percentage of minority teachers in the school district.
As it has done in cases involving judicial remedies, the Court found
that the voluntary layoff protection for minority employees was imper-
missible. The Court's plurality opinion, however, focused on the in-
adequacy of the school board's justification for the preference rather
than on the interference with the established expectations of minority
employees .14
On the one hand, the plurality in Wygant, in an opinion authored
by Justice Powell, refused to accept remedying past societal discrimi-
Justice Powell found "especially curious in light of the substantial number of Asians
admitted through the regular admissions process." 438 U.S. at 309 n.45, 98 S. Ct. at
2758 n.45.
68. Id. at 307, 98 S. Ct. at 2757 ("If [the medical school's] purpose is to assume
within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because
of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial
but as facially invalid").
69. Id. at 307-15, 98 S. Ct. at 2757-61. The legitimate interests identified, by Justice
Powell were eliminating effects of past discrimination, improving health-care services in
undeserved communities, and achieving a diverse student body.
70. Id. at 315-19, 98 S. Ct. at 2761-63.
71. 476 U.S. 267, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
72. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined the portions
of Justice Powell's opinion that embraced strict scrutiny, id. at 269, 106 S. Ct. at 1844.
73. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion emphasized that the layoff provision was
part of a collective bargaining agreement that "was forged in the crucible of clashing
interests." Id. at 311, 106 S. Ct. at 1866 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. Justice White, who concurred in the judgment, emphasized the impact of the
layoff provision on existing employees. Id. at 294, 106 S. Ct. at 1857 (White, J.,
concurring).
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nation against minorities as a permissible objective for affirmative action
programs. The school board argued that the layoff preference would
maintain minority teachers as "role models" for the large number of
minority students in the school system. 71 Justice Powell's opinion an-
nouncing the judgment of the Court rejected the concept of "[s]ocietal
discrimination" without proof of past discrimination by the particular
governmental body as "too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially
classified remedy." '76 His opinion also rejected the argument that the
affirmative action was a permissible remedy for past discriminatory hiring
practices. The failure here was an evidentiary one. The school board
had simply failed to prove that it had "convincing evidence that the
remedial action [was] warranted" to remedy the school board's "prior
discrimination" in hiring.
77
The only judgment that has upheld a voluntary affirmative action
program by a governmental body was the 1980 decision in Fullilove v.
Klutznick.71 Fullilove involved a challenge to a federal statute requiring
that ten percent of its federal grants for local public works projects be
used to purchase services or supplies from minority contractors. As in
Bakke, the Court failed to produce a majority opinion, and the Court's
three-way division makes it difficult to discern the precise basis for the
decision.
79
In his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Chief Justice
Burger found it unnecessary to decide what level of review applied to
federal affirmative action legislation. In his view, the federal program
was constitutional whether judged by strict scrutiny80 or the more lenient
75. Justice Stevens dissented in large part because of the validity of this goal. Id.
at 313, 106 S. Ct. at 1867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 276, 106 S. Ct. at 1848.
77. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion argued that, before a public employer
could adopt a race conscious affirmative action policy for employees the employer must
have "a firm basis for determining affirmative action is required." As an example of
evidence that would provide such a firm basis, she cited statistical disparity between "the
percentage of qualified blacks on a school's teaching staff and the percentage of qualified
minorities in the relevant labor pool." Id. at 292, 106 S. Ct. at 1856 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
78. 448 U.S. 448, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
79. Only Justices White and Powell joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion announcing
the judgment of the Court. Id. at 453, 100 S. Ct. at 2062. Justices Marshall, Brennan,
and Blackmun concurred in the judgment on the basis of the Bakke opinion advocating
a "reasonableness" standard for reviewing affirmative action cases. Id. at 517, 100 S.
Ct. at 2794. Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens dissented. Id. at 522, 532, 100 S.
Ct. at 2797, 2802.
80. Justice Powell's concurring opinion explained why he believed the federal statute
satisfied the strict scrutiny he had advocated in Bakke. Id. at 495, 100 S. Ct. at 2783
(Powell, J., concurring).
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"reasonableness" standard suggested in the Bakke opinions of Justices
Brennan and Marshall."'
The Chief Justice emphasized three factors that distinguished Bakke
and required validation of the federal set-aside program. First, review
of a federal program required that the Court show "appropriate def-
erence" to the congressional finding of past discrimination in the award-
ing of public contracts . 2 Second, the program was an exercise of the
"comprehensive remedial power" expressly conferred on Congress in
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Third, the means chosen
were appropriately tailored to the remedial purpose. Any burden imposed
on nonminority firms was "relatively light" when the set-aside program
was "compared with overall construction contracting opportunities" and
viewed in light of the competitive benefits nonminority firms had received
from past exclusion of minority firms. In addition, the statute allowed
waiver of the set-aside requirements when grantees demonstrated that
their best efforts could not achieve the "statutory 10% target for mi-
nority firm participation. 8 s4
The Fullilove opinion encouraged many state and local govern-
ments-including the city of Richmond, Virginia-to adopt minority set-
aside provisions for locally funded public works contracts. In City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 5 the Supreme Court called these pro-
visions into question when it held the Richmond program unconstitu-
tional .86
In April of 1983, the Richmond city council adopted an ordinance
requiring that 30 percent of the subcontracts on its public works contracts
81. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in the
judgment on the ground that "the racial classifications employed in the set-aside provision
are substantially related to the achievement of the important and congressionally articulated
goal of remedying the present effects of past racial discrimination." Id. at 521, 100 S.
Ct. at 2797.
82. Id. at 472, 100 S. Ct. at 2771. Justice Powell developed the factual basis for
the congressional determination in greater depth. Id. at 503-06, 100 S. Ct. at 2787-89.
83. Id. at 483, 100 S. Ct. at 2777.
84. Id. at 484-88, 100 S. Ct. at 2778-80.
85. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). Six members of the Court concurred in the judgment.
See id. at 712 (O'Connor, J., announcing the opinion of the Court), 730 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment), 735 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented. Id. at 739.
86. Lower court decisions invalidating other set-aside programs followed quickly on
the heels of Croson. See, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 710 F. Supp.
1532 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (preliminary injunction against state set-aside program is justified
because of lack of specific evidence of past discrimination against identified minorities);
American Subcontractors Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 376 S.E.2d 662 (1989)
(city's minority set-aside ordinance that is not supported by convincing evidence of prior
discrimination against qualified local minority contractors and that is not narrowly tailored
to remedy prior discrimination violates state and federal constitutions).
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be awarded to minority business enterprises. The ordinance generally
tracked the federal statute sustained in Fullilove: It included the same
groups within its definition of minority; it remained in effect for five
years; it included a waiver provision; and it adopted a set-aside per-
centage about halfway between the difference between the minority
population of the city and the percentage of city contracts that had
been awarded to minorities.
The lawsuit challenged the city's decision to rebid a contract after
the sole bidder had failed to achieve the desired minority participation.
Prior to submitting the bid, the bidder contacted several minority firms
for subcontract quotations, but none responded. After the bid had been
accepted, a minority subcontractor offered to supply contract items at
a cost more than $7,000 higher than the quotations on which the bid
was based. The contractor asked the city to waive the minority partic-
ipation requirement or to raise the contract price to cover the higher
subcontracting cost. The city refused both requests and elected to rebid
the project.
Croson produced the plethora of opinions characteristic of affir-
mative action cases, although a majority of the Court did concur in
portions of Justice O'Connor's opinion announcing the judgment. On
each of the remaining issues, her position also appears to command a
majority of the Court, even though the makeup of the majority varies
from issue to issue.
The Chief Justice and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy agreed
with Justice O'Connor's position that Wygant controlled . 7 According
to the majority opinion, the Richmond ordinance was invalid because
it suffered from the same two defects that had required invalidation of
the Wygant layoff policy. The city council's findings were insufficiently
precise to justify a minority set-aside, and the means chosen were not
"narrowly tailored" to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
Justice O'Connor found the evidence insufficient to support the need
for a set-aside requirement within the city of Richmond. On the one
hand, a finding of discrimination in the construction industry in the
United States was too "generalized" to support a set-aside program in
a particular locality. In her view, such a generalized finding failed to
provide the requisite "guidance for a legislative body to determine the
precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy." ' On the other hand,
the evidence before the city council was also inadequate to justify the
30 percent set-aside as a necessary remedy for past discrimination in
the Richmond construction industry. The testimony of proponents was
too generalized to allow the use of a suspect classification in the or-
87. 109 S. Ct. at 712.
88. Id. at 723.
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dinance, and the statistics on which the city relied were insufficient to
establish the need for a set-aside program for city contracts. The statistics
showed that few minority firms had benefitted from city contracts and
that local contractor associations contained few minority members. They
failed, however, to establish the existence of qualified minority firms
who had been excluded from city contracts or local contractor associ-
ations. Thus, they did not demonstrate that the low percentages resulted
from municipal discrimination or municipal acquiescence in private dis-
crimination. "In sum, none of the evidence presented by the city points
to any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction indus-
try.'' 89
Because the Richmond ordinance was "not linked to identified dis-
crimination in any way," Justice O'Connor found it "almost impossible"
to analyze whether it was "narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrim-
ination." She did, however, note two specific deficiencies. First, the
record did not demonstrate that the city considered "the use of race-
neutral means to increase minority business participation in city con-
tracting." Second, the use of a "rigid numerical quota" was particularly
objectionable in the city's contracting procedures because Richmond
already considered contract "bids and waivers on a case-by-case basis." 90
The Chief Justice and Justices White and Kennedy joined the por-
tions of Justice O'Connor's opinion identifying "strict scrutiny" as the
appropriate standard for the Richmond ordinance. 9' Justice O'Connor
gave both a general justification for her approach and an additional
reason why it was particularly appropriate in Croson. She identified two
general reasons that strict scrutiny was proper for any affirmative action
program that creates "a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in
an aspect of public decisionmaking." First, "such race-based measures"
implicate the "personal rights" of other groups not encompassed within
the racial classification; second, "[c]lassifications based on race carry a
danger of stigmatic harm" to the very groups they are designed to
help. 92 Moreover, the use of strict scrutiny was especially appropriate
in the Richmond case because blacks constitute the political majority
in the city. 9a Justice O'Connor was careful, however, to reaffirm that
her "strict scrutiny" standard did not preclude all affirmative action
programs. Not only did it allow for racial classifications based on proper
findings of discrimination against minorities, it also allowed other race-
neutral approaches to remedy the effects of past discrimination. 9
89. Id. at 727.
90. Id. at 728.
91. Id. at 712.
92. Id. at 721.
93. Id. at 722.
94. Id. at 729-30.
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The Chief Justice and Justice White concurred in the remaining
section of Justice O'Connor's opinion in which she distinguished Fullilove
on the basis of the stricter scrutiny required for state affirmative action
programs. 9 This approach was appropriate, she argued, because only
Congress "has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates
of the Fourteenth Amendment. '96 Fullilove was decided on the basis of
this congressional power to "identify and [to] redress the effects of
society-wide discrimination. '97 States and local governments had similar
powers, she suggested, only when the discrimination they were redressing
occurred in their jurisdictions.9 8
Even though only a plurality of the Court expressly joined some
portions of Justice O'Connor's opinion, the opinion still provides a
reliable guide to predicting the result in future litigation. Careful attention
to the concurring and dissenting opinions suggests the approach outlined
in each portion of the opinion is likely to command the support of a
majority of the present Court in future litigation.
Only four members of the Court joined the portions of Justice
O'Connor's opinion declaring "strict scrutiny" the appropriate standard
for reviewing affirmative action programs of state and local governments,
but a majority of the present Court appears to endorse that basic
approach. Justice Scalia, who concurred only in the Croson judgment,
would place even stricter limits on the power of local and state gov-
ernments to adopt affirmative action programs. He would allow states
to "act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimination"' in only
one circumstance: "where that is necessary to eliminate their own main-
tenance of a system of unlawful racial classification." 99 Furthermore,
Justice Stevens carefully examined governmental justifications in his
Fullilovel°° and Wygant'0 dissents, although his concurring opinion in
Croson suggested that trying "to identify the characteristics of the
advantaged and disadvantaged classes that might justify their disparate
treatment" was more "constructive" than "engaging in a debate over
the proper standard of review." 102
Just three members of the Court embraced the portion of Justice
O'Connor's opinion reaffirming Congress' broad remedial power to
redress the effects of past discrimination by public and private bodies.
95. Id. at 712.
96. Id. at 719.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 720.
99. Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. 448 U.S. 448, 532, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2803 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. 476 U.S. 267, 313, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1867 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 732 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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Nonetheless, the approach it follows also appears to command a majority
of the Court. All three dissenters in Croson voted to sustain the federal
set-aside in Fullilove 03 and they are likely to embrace a distinction that
will maintain that precedent. Moreover, only Justice Stevens appears to
reject the distinction categorically. 0 4 Even Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion termed the distinction a "sound" one that was based on "social
reality and governmental theory."'0 5
Despite the Court's continuing divisions on affirmative action issues,
Croson appears to reflect a contemporary consensus that is likely to
govern these issues in the immediate future. A majority of the Court
is committed to strict scrutiny of all remedial programs that use explicit
racial classifications. That approach will uphold racial set-asides in local
affirmative action programs only when they are narrowly drawn to serve
compelling governmental interests.
The recent cases have begun to clarify what constitutes a compelling
governmental interest under the strict scrutiny standard. Remedying past
discrimination against a minority group by the government that has
established the affirmative action program qualifies as a compelling
governmental interest even without a judicial finding of past discrimi-
nation. Remedying the past effects of private discrimination, however,
amounts to a compelling governmental interest only when the discrim-
ination is localized within the jurisdiction of the governmental body that
is adopting the affirmative action program; a general showing that the
minority has suffered from discrimination in the United States will not
suffice.
The second prong of the strict scrutiny standard imposes another
hurdle. Even when affirmative action programs are enacted in furtherance
of compelling governmental interests, they must be narrowly drawn, and
perhaps even "necessary" to the achievement of those goals. 0 6 This
requirement means that local governments can use racial set-asides in
affirmative action programs only if they can show the set-aside provision
is narrowly drawn to remedy the past discrimination that the government
is seeking to cure. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion suggests
that this aspect of strict scrutiny will normally require that governments
demonstrate why race-neutral approaches to affirmative action would
not work. 07
103. Id. at 517, 100 S. Ct. at 2794 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, J.J., con-
curring).
104. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 730 (Stevens, J., concurring), and Fullilove, 448 U.S.
at 532, 100 S. Ct. at 2803 (Stevens, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 736 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. Justice O'Connor used the narrowly tailored language. 109 S. Ct. at 728. For
earlier cases using the "necessary" formulation, see supra note 66.
107. 109 S. Ct. at 728.
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Of course, the hurdles that the Court has imposed for racial set-
asides do not foreclose all affirmative action programs. Programs that
use race-neutral criteria are apparently not subject to strict scrutiny. 08
Even if they disproportionately aid a particular minority group, they
do not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless a plaintiff can prove
that they were adopted with the intent to discriminate against a particular
racial or ethnic group. 0 9 Moreover, affirmative action programs that
require special efforts to contact minority groups would also appear less
objectionable since they do not deny unfavored groups the opportunity
to compete.110
In light of Croson, local governments obviously have no duty to
adopt affirmative action programs without a prior judicial finding of
past discrimination. Local governments that desire to adopt such pro-
grams have two alternatives. They can either devise programs that iden-
tify characteristics other than race which are the effects of past
discrimination, or they can document evidence of past discrimination
within their jurisdictions.
A post-Croson ordinance of the New Orleans City Council adopted
the race-neutral approach. The ordinance enacts an affirmative action
program for city contracting that gives preference to "businesses owned
and controlled by economically and socially disadvantaged persons."
Any business that qualifies can be placed on a registry of businesses
entitled to benefit from the city's set-aside program. "
The state has taken the second approach. It has commissioned a
study to document the effects of past discrimination in the Louisiana
construction industry. "2 The state presumably expects the results of the
study to justify use of the racial classifications in a minority set-aside
program for state public works contracts." 3
A statement issued by constitutional law scholars after the Croson
decision supports the continued use of racial classifications in set-aside
programs where the effects of past discrimination within a jurisdiction
108. Id. at 729-30.
109. For examples of the Court's refusal to find equal protection violations on the
basis of discriminatory impact alone, see McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S. Ct.
1756 (1987); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
110. O'Connor emphasized that the Richmond program established a "rigid" standard.
E.g., 109 S. Ct. at 728 ("rigid numerical quota"); id. at 729 ("rigid line drawn on the
basis of a suspect classification").
111. City of New Orleans, Louisiana, Ordinance No. 13,139 (March 6, 1989 Mayor
Council Series) (adding Chapter 2, Article XX of the New Orleans City Code).
112. La. R.S. 47:821(B), as added by 1989 La. Acts No. 9 (lst Extraordinary Session).
113. Id. § 821(D).
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can be documented. ' 4 Nonetheless, local governments would probably
be wise to adopt the race-neutral approach whenever possible. One
disadvantage of reliance on studies of past discrimination is the likelihood
that individuals who have been the victims of the discrimination doc-
umented in a study may use the study as evidence in an action against
the local government for discrimination. Another disadvantage is the
uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court will accept local set-asides
even when established to remedy prior discrimination within a local
government's jurisdiction. The Court may well hold that the set-asides
are not necessary to remedy the prior discrimination unless the local
government shows that race-neutral approaches have failed.' 5
To establish effective affirmative action programs based on race-
neutral criteria, local governments should identify how discrimination
affects future ability to compete. The deficiencies thus identified should
then be the criteria for preferential treatment. Identification of these
criteria would obviously be an expensive proposition, but it is the type
of project local governments might cooperate in funding. Moreover,
identification of the likely effects of discrimination should also be re-
search that is transferable from one jurisdiction to another." 6
Of course, the effectiveness of a race-neutral program will depend
on the willingness of administrators to execute that program without
contemporary discrimination against the minority. Local governments
that are concerned with preventing present discrimination rather than
remedying the effects of discrimination in the past may want to adopt
programs that require contractors or others to show a good-faith effort
to include minorities. To the extent that these programs emphasize good-
faith efforts rather than preferential treatment, this type of race conscious
remedy may survive strict scrutiny. In such programs, even generalized
evidence of past discrimination would probably justify a local government
in avoiding a continuation of the past discrimination. Moreover, the
impact on innocent individuals who are not part of the protected minority
would be much less significant. They would not be denied the right to
compete; the local government would merely be ensuring that they were
not the beneficiaries of impermissible discrimination.
TORT LIABILITY
The abolition of governmental immunity in the Louisiana Consti-
tution of 1974" 7 has produced a variety of new questions regarding the
114. Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 Yale L.J. 1711 (1989).
115. See 109 S. Ct. 706, 728 (1989) (O'Connor, J., for the court).
116. Because the effects of discrimination are likely to be the same in different
jurisdictions, research findings would be transferable. In that respect, the effects of
discrimination would be unlike proof of prior discrimination, which must be specific to
the particular jurisdiction. See 109 S. Ct. at 726-27 (O'Connor, J.).
117. La. Const. art XII, § 10. For a summary of judicial limits on governmental
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scope of governmental tort liability. A recurring issue that has frequently
merited discussion in the pages of this portion of the annual symposium
is the identification of the employers of public officials who serve at
the local level but are relatively immune from control by parochial or
municipal governments."' During 1988-89, the issue resurfaced in two
decisions by Louisiana courts of appeal.
Appreciating the current state of Louisiana law requires a brief
review of the recent past. In its 1977 decision in Foster v. Hampton,"9
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the parish was not the employer
of a deputy sheriff for purposes of imposing tort liability. In dicta, the
court also indicated that the state would be liable as the deputy's
employer, 20 and it converted that dicta to holding in 1980 after the
state had been added as a defendant in the litigation.' 2'
The legislature quickly indicated its displeasure with the supreme
court's rule making the state liable for torts of deputy sheriffs. In 1978,
it enacted a statute expressly declaring that the state was not liable for
the torts committed by sheriffs or other public officers who serve at
the local level or their "employees."' ' 22 The Louisiana Supreme Court,
however, continued to apply the rationale of its rule treating the state
as employer of deputy sheriffs in cases involving coroners and constables
where the torts occurred prior to the passage of the 1978 legislation. 2 1
Reconsidering the issue in light of the 1978 legislation, the court
adopted a more functional approach in Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish
Sheriff's Department.2 4 Relying on the "reality of the situation," the
court in Jenkins held that the sheriff, not the state or the parish, was
immunity prior to 1974, see Murchison, Local Government Law, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term, 38 La. L. Rev. 462, 474 n.73 (1978).
118. See Murchison, 1984-1985 Developments in the Law, supra note 36, at 523-25;
Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984, 45 La. L. Rev.
357, 391-95 (1984); Murchison 1982-1983 Developments in the Law, supra note 44, at
407-10; Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982, 43 La.
L. Rev. 461, 477-83 (1982); Murchison, 1980-1981 Developments in the Law, supra note
39, at 584-87; Murchison, 1979-1980 Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 518-24;
Murchison, 1978-1979 Term, supra note 44, at 710-12; Murchison, 1977-1978 Term, supra
note 44, at 871-79; Murchison, 1976-1977 Term, supra note 117, at 476-80.
119. 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977), analyzed in Murchison, 1977-1978 Term, supra note
44, at 873-77.
120. 352 So. 2d at 201.
121. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, 1979-
1980 Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 518-24.
122. 1978 La. Acts No. 318, amending La. R.S. 33:1433 and adding La. R.S. 42:1441,
analyzed in Murchison, 1977-1978 Term, supra note 44, at 877-79.
123. Mullins v. State, 387 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980); Hryhorchuck v. Smith, 390 So.
2d 497 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, 1980-1981 Developments in the Law, supra
note 39, at 584-87.
124. 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981), analyzed in Murchison, 1981-1982 Developments in
the Law, supra note 118, at 479-83.
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the employer of deputies for tort liability purposes. 2 5 Because the sheriff
acted "solely in his official capacity" in the employment relationship,
tort liability was also limited to that official capacity.126 By identifying
the sheriff as the "appropriate governmental entity on which to place
responsibility,' 27 the court overruled, as a practical matter, a long line
of cases holding that the sheriff's office was not a juridical entity capable
of being sued.
28
The Louisiana Supreme Court limited the functional approach of
Jenkins to the issue of vicarious tort liability. In 1983, the court declined
to follow Jenkins in construing a state statute providing indemnity to
any state employee who was held liable for damages in a claim arising
out of the course and scope of the employee's employment. It ruled
that the individual working in a district attorney's office was an employee
of the state under the indemnity statute.
29
Following the 1983 decision, the legislature enacted a more com-
prehensive provision as part of a series of tort reforms adopted in
1985.130 The 1985 statute retains the 1978 revision that expressly disa-
vowed state liability for "damage caused by a district attorney, coroner,
assessor, sheriff, clerk of court, or [other] public officer of a political
subdivision" or the deputies, assistants, employees, appointees, designees,
or representatives of any such officer.' 3 ' In addition, it affirmatively
declares that "[tihe master of an individual who is an elected . . . public
officer, official, or employee of a political subdivision" is "the particular
political subdivision of which such individual is a public officer, official,
or employee."'12 It also prescribes the following three "determinants"
for deciding which political subdivision is liable for torts committed by
public officers and their employees:
(1) The territorial jurisdiction and . . . extent of the gov-
ernmental body politic comprising the electorate who usually
elects such public officer, if he is elected, or who usually elects
the public officer who appoints such public officer, if he is
appointed ....
125. 402 So. 2d at 671.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish Sheriff's Dept., 350 So. 2d
236, 238-39 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 352 So. 2d 235 (1977).
129. Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 699 (La. 1983), analyzed in Murchison,
1983-1984 Developments in the Law, supra note 118, at 393-95.
130. 1985 La. Acts No. 451, adding La. R.S. 42:1441.1-.4, analyzed in Murchison,
1984-1985 Developments in the Law, supra note 36, at 523-25. A 1984 statute had overruled
the express holding of Diaz. See 1984 La. Acts No. 923.
131. La. R.S. 42:1441 (Supp. 1989).
132. Id. § 1441.3(A).
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(2) The source of the funds used for the operating expenses
of the office in which such public officer serves; and
(3) Unless such public officer is elected directly by the
electorate of the political subdivision of which he is such [an]
officer, the office of the individual who has the right to control
closely the daily time and physical activities of such public officer
in carrying out his public duties.'
Finally, the statute concludes by specifically identifying various decisions
that correctly interpreted the status of public officers and their
subordinates'3 4 and by describing three decisions of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, including Foster v. Hampton, as "misinterpretations and
misapplications of Civil Code Article 2320 and other laws imposing
liability on a master for the offenses and quasi-offenses of his servant."''
The 1985 legislation clearly expresses its basic intention, which was
to relieve the state of liability for the torts of public officials and their
subordinates who serve at the local level. Nonetheless, it remains am-
biguous as to whether the employer is the public officer "in his official
capacity" or the local government exercising general legislative jurisdic-
tion over the area that the public officer serves. In light of Jenkins'
definition of the sheriff as a "governmental entity,"' 3 6 application of
the statutory criteria would seem to warrant finding that the sheriff
(and other public officers by analogy) is the employer "in his official
capacity." The statute says, however, that the master is "the particular
political subdivision.' ' 37 The definition of that term, which is retained
from the 1978 legislation, does not expressly include public officers,'
although Section 1441.2 says that the offices of public officers are
"separate 'local governmental subdivisions' for the purposes of pur-
chasing insurance or establishing interlocal risk management pools.3 9
133. Id.
134. Id. § 1441.4(4) (praising Sullivan v. Quick, 406 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1981), writ denied, 467 So. 2d 1134 (1985) and Martinez v. Reynolds, 398 So. 2d 156
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), as correct interpretations of the master-servant relationship in
the context of public officers and their subordinates. See also La. R.S. 42:1441.4(1) (Supp.
1989) (identifying Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 215 So. 2d 902 (1968), as employing
the proper method of analyzing the vicarious liability issue).
135. La. R.S. 42:1441.4(2) (Supp. 1989).
136. 402 So. 2d 696, 671 (La. 1981).
137. La. R.S. 42:1441.3(A) (Supp. 1989).
138. Id. § 1441(C) (Term "political subdivision" includes any "parish municipality,
and any other unit of local government, including a school board and a special district,
authorized by law to perform governmental functions"). Of course, in light of Jenkins,
the sheriff "in his official capacity" may now be a "unit of local government."
139. Id. § 1441.2(B).
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During the last year, the question of the proper interpretation of
the 1985 statute arose in two courts of appeal.1 40 They confirmed that
the legislation precluded state liability, but they adhered to the decision
of the Louisiana Supreme Court refusing to hold the parish governing
authority liable for the torts of deputy sheriffs.
The first of the decisions, Cooley v. State, 41 held that the state was
not vicariously liable for injuries a state prisoner suffered while incar-
cerited in a parish prison. The plaintiff alleged that deputy sheriffs had
mistreated him while he was incarcerated in the parish prison. Relying
on Jenkins, the fourth circuit held that Louisiana law no longer rec-
ognized the state as the employer of a deputy sheriff. Of course, Jenkins
did not "squarely decide the [sitate's liability" because the state was
not a party to the action.142 The fourth circuit found, however, that
the Louisiana Supreme Court's realistic analysis of the employment
relationship between sheriffs and their deputies and the court's dicta
regarding the state's lack of control over deputies to be dispositive.143
The court of appeal was not persuaded to reach a different result because
the plaintiff was a state prisoner who had remained in the physical
custody of the sheriff as a result of overcrowding in the state prison
system. Not only did the plaintiff's contention conflict with the "plain
language" of the statute, 44 it was also inconsistent with the reality of
the plaintiff's prison status. The state exercised little control over the
terms of the plaintiff's incarceration, and the alleged misconduct of the
deputies was unrelated to the limited control that the state exercised. 45
More recently, the first circuit held, in Nail v. Parish of Iberville,146
that the sheriff, not the parish, was the employer who was vicariously
liable for a deputy sheriff's tort. A review of the decisions prior to
1985 convinced the court that they were "consistent in holding that the
sheriff and not the parish was vicariously liable for the tort[s] of a
deputy sheriff."'' 47 Thus, the question in Nall was whether the 1985
legislation overruled this consistent judicial interpretation.
The court of appeal found that the guidelines of the 1985 legislation
supported imposing liability on the sheriff rather than the parish. The
territorial jurisdiction guideline was neutral because the territorial juris-
diction of the sheriff and the territorial extent of the electorate that
140. Nail v. Parish of Iberville, 542 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Cooley v.
State, 533 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
141. 533 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
142. Id. at 125.
143. Id. at 126.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 126-27.
146. 542 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
147. Id. at 147.
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elected the sheriff were identical to the geographic boundaries of the
parish. However, the second and third factors favored imposing vicarious
liability on the sheriff. "[T]he funds used to operate the sheriff's office"
came not from the parish but "from a variety of public sources, primarily
fees earned by the Sheriff's Office as tax collector and in civil and
criminal matters." Moreover, the sheriff-hot the parish governing au-
thority-was "the individual who has the right to closely control the
daily time and physical activities of deputy sheriffs.' ' 4
The first circuit found additional support for its decision that the
sheriff was the responsible governmental entity in "the legislative findings
and purposes detaiied in [the 1985 statute]."'' 49 Those findings explicitly
endorged a 1968 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court'50 that resolved
employment issues on a practical analysis of the employmeni relationship.
In the case of deputy sheriffs, that analysis indicated that the sheriff
was the employer.'' The findings also explicitly approved two post-
Jenkins opinions that reached the same conclusion as the first circuit
"regarding the sheriff's vicarious liability for a tort committed by a
deputy sheriff." ''52
Considered together, the recent decisions of the courts of appeal
provide a reasonable application of the 1985 statute in light of Jenkins.
They accept the legislative mandate without abandoning the functional
approach that offers the best strategy for reaching a sensible conclusion
to the lengthy controversy over the vicarious liability issue.
The court in Cooley appropriately accepted the basic legislative rule
without hesitation. The legislature enacted the 1985 statute in response
to a decision that narrowly construed earlier legislation eliminating the
state's vicarious liability for the torts of local officials.' The 1985
statute renders clear the legislative determination that state liability for
148. Id. at 148 (footnote omitted).
149. Id. at 149.
150. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 215 So. 2d 902 (1968).
151. 542 So. 2d at 149.
152. The court notes that La. R.S. 42:1441.4(4) (Supp. 1989) approves of Sullivan v.
Quick, 406 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), writ denied, 467 So. 2d 1134 (1985)
and Martinez v. Reynolds, 398 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (analyzed in Murchison,
1981-1982 Developments, supra note 118, at 482) supports the court's finding. Id. (footnote
omitted).
In the omitted footnote, the court stated:
Additional authority for this result is evident in the arrangement in the Louisiana
Constitution of the respective provisions relating to sheriffs and local government.
Article six deals exclusively with the topic of local government. The fact that
the provision dealing with sheriffs is not found in this article, but rather in
article 5, § 27, indicates the sheriff's office was not intended to be a unit of
local government.
Id. n.4.
153. Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 699 (La. 1983).
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the torts of local officials and their subordinates should be completely
eliminated. Continued judicial attempts to circumvent that determination
would amount to a rejection of legislative supremacy in the making of
law.5 4 The state's vicarious liability should not be altered by the plain-
tiff's status as a state prisoner. Although that status might impose some
independent duties on the state,' it does not alter the lack of an
employment relationship between the deputies and the state.
The issue in Nall presented a more difficult problem because the
legislature made no explicit determination as to what local entity should
be liable for the torts of public officers and their subordinates. As noted
above, the statutory language is ambiguous as to whether a public officer
can be the employer who is vicariously liable under its provisions. The
subsection defining the "political subdivision[s]" that are to be the
employers of public officers and their subordinates does not expressly
include public officers.'56 Public officers, however, are designated "gov-
ernmental subdivisions" in another section authorizing the purchase of
insurance and the creation of risk-management pools.'57
Faced with this statutory imprecision, the first circuit wisely embraced
the functional analysis of the employment relationship that the supreme
court had endorsed in Jenkins. The sheriff is the individual with day-
to-day control over deputies, and the sheriff "in his official capacity"
should bear the financial burden of a deputy's torts. Of course, collection
may be difficult because the assets that the sheriff controls are probably
not subject to seizure.' The collection problem, however, will also be
present if the parish is liable.'5 9 Moreover, an invidious or irrational
refusal to pay may render the sheriff personally liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
154. Of course, the courts could overrule the legislative rule by declaring it uncon-
stitutional. However, that approach seems ihconsistent with the designation of the sheriff's
office as a "governmental entity" in Jenkins. See Murchison, 1981-1982 Developments
in the Law, supra note 118, at 482.
155. Cf. Whatley v. State, 369 So. 2d 1125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), analyzed in
Murchison, 1978-1979 Term, supra note 44, at 711-12 (parish governing body may be
independently liable to prisoner for failure to perform statutory duties with respect to
parish prison). But see Nolen v. State, 377 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), criticized
in Murchison, 1979-1980 Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 519-20 (sheriff has
no duty to train deputies properly or to adopt safe and proper police practices).
156. La. R.S. 42:1441 (Supp. 1989); see supra note 138.
157. La. R.S. 42:1441.3(B) (Supp. 1989).
158. Cf. Bulot v. Justice, 529 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 528 So.
2d 564 (1988) (property of clerk of court is not subject to seizure).
159. De Laureal Engineers, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish Police Jury, 406 So. 2d 770
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 758 (1982), analyzed in Murchison,
1981-1982 Developments in the Law, supra note 118, at 488-89; Foreman v. Vermillion
Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 339 So. 2d 846
(1976), analyzed in Murchison, 1976-1977 Term, supra note 117, at 475-76.
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Whether the Nall analysis would produce a similar result for other
public officers is unclear because other public officers may be more
financially dependent on the parish governing body than was the sheriff
in Nail. 60 Although this financial dependence does alter the third guide-
line of the 1985 legislation, it should not change the final result for
two reasons. First, other public officers sometimes have other revenue
sources.' 6' Second, some public officers-most commonly, district at-
torneys-serve geographic areas that extend beyond a single parish. Thus,
imposing liability on the public officer would avoid additional analytical
problems that would be created if the parish governing body were the
employer, because the possibility would then arise that an officer or an
officer's subordinate might have multiple employers.
160. A recent opinion of the Attorney General held that the parish governing body,
not the state, was the employer who was liable for reimbursing an assistant district
attorney's legal fees under La. R.S. 42:1442 (Supp. 1989). Op. Att'y Gen. No. 210A
(September 8, 1989). The opinion applies the guidelines of La. R.S. 42:1441.3(B) (Supp.
1989) without considering whether the district attorney "in his official capacity" would
be a political subdivision who could be the responsible "political subdivision." In the
case the opinion addressed, naming the district attorney as the responsible employer may
not have changed the result because state law required the parish to pay the operating
expenses of the district attorney's office. However, as pointed out in the text, the district
attorney might be required to use other funds to pay a judgment. Moreover, in some
cases a district attorney's jurisdiction covers a geographic area that encompasses more
than one parish.
161. E.g., La. R.S. 15:571.11 (1981 & Supp. 1989), La. R.S. 16:15, (Supp. 1989)
(special funds available to district attorneys). But see Reed v. Washington Parish Police
Jury, 518 So. 2d 1044 (La. 1988), criticized in Murchison, Local Government Law,
Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 49 La. L. Rev. 367, 378-82 (1988) (holding special
funds available to district attorneys to be supplementary to parish duty to fund the
reasonable expenses of the district attorney's office).

